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Abstract 
In this article we analyze a historical example of govemment 
intervention in a drug market. At the beginning of this century the Dutch 
govemment controlled the opium market in the Dutch East Indies - nowadays 
Indonesia - for several decades. This state monopoly was called the 
'opiumregie'. Using information gathered during the opiumregie, we estimate 
price elasticities of opium consumption. It appears that short term price 
elasticities of opium use are about -1.0. Long term elasticities are about -1.25. 
Our analysis indicates that opium users were quite able to adjust their 
consumption in response to a price change. During the opiumregie the real 
opium price increased substantially, leading to an impressive reduction in 
opium consumption. 

1. Introduction 
For decades many international organisations, national governments 
and local authorities have tried to root out drug production, drug trade and 
drug use by means of total prohibition and deterrence. The lack of enduring 
success, the heavy social costs, the distorting effects on Third World drug 
producing economies and the financial burden on Western countries, of this 
worldwide war on drugs has led to rising dissent and impatience with the 
prohibitive approach. 
The drug problem has many faces or, as a Dutch observer in the 19th 
century said, it is a hydra-headed monster. But, the drug problem may be 
analyzed as a market problem and government policy can be analyzed in terms 
of market regulation. The extent of market regulation may differ. The main 
policy until now has been prohibition, which aims at market repression. At 
the other end of the spectrum of market regulation is market f reedom, 
implying an uncontrolled legalization of drugs. A situation of market freedom 
is unacceptable for everyone who considers drug use to be a major social 
problem. Uncontrolled legalization does not seem to be a plausible policy 
option. The only real alternative to prohibition is controlled legalization, i.e. 
market intervention. Market intervention means that public authority, most 
obviously the state, excludes free enterprise from the drug market, takes 
control over the drug market itself, and intervenes by regulation of supply and 
demand. 
Although market intervention allows for a combination of the positive 
elements of prohibition with some elements of a legal situation, it should be 
considered in its own right. But how? Nowadays drugs are illegal everywhere. 
There is no current experience with a legal market. Is it true, as the 
supporters of legalisation claim, that the illegal market will collapse as soon as 
a legal supply exists, thus ending much of the current organised crime? Or is 
it true, that a legal supply of drugs will stimulate the use of drugs? What will 
happen depends on the exact nature of the market intervention and the way in 
which market intervention affects the price of drugs. Legalisation will 
probably lead to substantially lower prices (Examples of a discussion on policy 
alternatives: Clague (1973), Moore (1973), White and Luksetich (1983), Clark 
(1992)). To a large extent, the effect of legalization will depend on the price 
elasticity of drug use. Not much is known about this price elasticity. A rare 
study which presents direct estimates of the price elasticity of a drug is Nisbet 
and Vakil (1972) who find a price elasticity of marihuana in the range of -1.0 
to -1.5. Miron and Zwiebel (1991), analyzing US alcohol consumption during 
Prohibition, find a small negative price elasticity for alcohol use. Based on 
this, they claim that the price elasticity of drug use is small, so the increase in 
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drug consumption upon legalization is small. However, Becker, Grossman and 
Murphy (1991), referring to price elasticities of smoking, heavy drinking and 
gambling, claim that the price elasticity of drugs is not small. Therefore, 
lower drug prices could signifïcantly expand drug use. 
This article presents information from actual government intervention 
in a drug market. From 1894 until the end of the 1930s a system of market 
intervention, called the 'opiumregie', was in operation in the Dutch East 
Indies (present day Indonesia). The system operated via a state monopoly on 
the importation, production and sale of opiates. 
The purpose of this article is twofold. First, we present a description 
of a government controlled drugs market, which seems to have been highly 
successful in terms of reducing the consumption of drugs. Second, we present 
empirical estimates of price elasticities of opium consumption. Our annual data 
consist of opium consumption, revenues and number of opium users, 
distinguished by ethnic group and 22 regions1. 
The article is set up as follows. Section 2 describes the characteristics 
of the opium users and opium use and the Dutch involvement in opium trade. 
Section 3 considers the policy goals and instruments of the opiumregie. 
Section 4 discusses the analysis of drug consumption in general terms. Section 
5 presents the results of the quantitative analysis of opium consumption in 
which price elasticities of opium are determined. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Opium in the Dutch East Indies 
2.1 Characteristics of opium 
Before we start to elaborate the characteristics of opium use and the 
opiumregie, we characterize opium itself; its varieties and prices, and its 
quality compared to opiates in the 1990s. 
In the first decade of the twentieth century the opiumregie sold four 
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 The 22 regions are grouped into two main areas 
Java and Madura: West-Java, Central-Java, East-Java, Yogyakarta, Surakarta. 
Outer Islands: Sumatra Westcoast, Tapanuli, Bengkulu, Lampung Districts, 
Palembang, Jambi, Sumatra Eastcoast, Aceh, Riau and Dependencies, Bangka and 
Belitung, West-Borneo, South- and East-Borneo, Manado, Celebes and 
Dependencies, Bali and Lombok, Timor and Dependencies, Moluccas. 
The data we use on opium are from the Jaarverslagen van de Dienst der Opiumregie 
('Yearly Accounts of the Opiumregie'), 1915-1938 and the Koloniale Verslagen 
('Colonial Reports'), 1890-1940. 
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different types of opium. One of them was crude opium, while three types 
were prepared forms, namely opium pills, tikee and tjandoe. Opium pills were 
only sold on the islands of Bangka and Belitung near Sumatra. They were 
mainly used by workers in the tin mines. All pills were imported from China, 
because the opium factory of the state was not capable of large scale 
manufacturing of pills conformable to Chinese tradition and users' preference. 
In accordance with the agreements made at the international opium 
conferences held at The Hague (1912-1914) the importation and subsequently 
the legal selling of opium pills was abandoned in 1914. 
Crude opium was only sold to Indigenous lords on the islands of Bali 
and Lombok. Some lords still owned very old monopolies for the preparation 
and sale of opium to their subjects. Goesti G'de Djilantik, lord of the city of 
Karangasem, was the last Balinese lord who possessed such rights. He died in 
april 1916. After his death the Dutch authorities stopped the selling of crude 
opium altogether. 
On Java the opiumregie sold prepared opium mixed with carved leaves 
of a plant called Ficus Septiva. This traditional mixture was called tikee. The 
habit of smoking tikee was especially widespread in the late nineteenth century 
among the lower class population on central Java. In those days marihuana 
and tobacco were also frequently added to tikee, but the Opiumregie did not 
produce these varieties. This mixture of psychotropic substances was 
considered to be a greater threat to health than pure opium. For this reason, 
and also because tikee was perishable, the production and selling of tikee was 
greatly reduced after 1914. In 1917 the last amounts of tikee were sold. 
In conclusion, after September 1917 tjandoe was the only type of 
opium that was sold officially in the entire Dutch East Indies. The tjandoe of 
the state had a Standard quality. It contained 11 to 13 percent morphine. 
However, scientific research has shown that the narcotic effects were stronger 
than the percentage of morphine suggested. Today, the Street level quality of 
illegal heroin is often not much stronger than the pure tjandoe sold by the 
opiumregie. So, in analyzing the consumption of opium we are analyzing the 
market of one of the hardest drugs. 
2.2 Characteristics of opium users 
Table 1 gives some information about the population of the Dutch East 
Indies and some characteristics of opium consumption in the year 1930. The 
Dutch part of the population is not mentioned in this table, because the 
number of opium users among the 260,000 Dutch was very small. 
table 1 about here 
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Table 1 shows a sharp contrast between the Indigenous and the Chinese part of 
the population. The Chinese were a minority in numbers, but on average their 
social and economie position was much better than that of the Indigenous 
population. The income per head of the Chinese was about the fivefold of that 
of the Indigenous population. In many respects the Chinese formed a middle 
class between the Dutch and the Indigenous people of the Indian Archipelago. 
While the Dutch were mainly involved in the civil service, the army, foreign 
trade and agricultural production for exports, and the Indigenous population 
was mainly involved in agriculture and fishing, the main Chinese occupation 
was commerce, which covered over one-third of working Chinese in the 
Census of 1930. Nearly one-fifth were engaged in industry, mainly as small 
craftsmen, and the rest were distributed between gardening, agriculture, and 
coolie labour on Dutch-owned plantations and mines. In the 1930s the number 
of Chinese increased in positions as teachers, dentists and doctors, in banking 
and as owners of industry in sugar and tobacco (Furnivall (1939)). From table 
1 it appears that a relative large share of the Chinese population used opium. 
Furthermore, Chinese opium users used more opium than their Indigenous 
companions: The share of the Chinese in the population of opium users 
averaged 47%, whereas their share in total population was 1.2% in 1930. 
2.3 Dutch involvement in the opium trade 
Dutch involvement in the opium trade started soon after the founding 
of the Dutch East Indies Company, the 'Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie', 
in 1602. This company, commonly known as VOC, bought raw opium in 
Bengal (India), paid with silver, and bartered it against spices in the Indian 
archipelago. According to Schama (1987) opium was also transported to the 
Netherlands, where it was smoked with tobacco. 
Dutch opium trade in the East Indies was very profïtable, but 
quantitatively small in the early years. Dutch sales of opium were modest until 
1678. For instance, from 1640-1652 the volume of opium sold at the Dutch 
trade centre Batavia (present day Jakarta) averaged 250 kilograms a year. It 
increased dramatically when the Dutch gained a monopoly in trading textiles 
and opium in the kingdom of Mataram (Central Java). In 1678, the first year 
of the monopoly, the Dutch traded 27,000 kilograms of opium at Batavia. The 
spectacular increase seems to indicate that the Dutch did not create the opium 
market on Java. Instead, they conquered an already existing market. 
At the beginning of the 19th century, the Dutch influence in Java was 
strong enough for taxes to be imposed on the Indigenous as well as the 
Chinese population. In 1808 the Dutch introduced a vice tax on the 
consumption of opium. This 'opium tax farm' obliged the opium dealers, who 
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now became official tax farmers, to only sell crude opium delivered by the 
state, whereas the tax farmers gained the exclusive right to prepare and sell 
opium in their territory. For this profitable right, the Chinese tax farmers had 
to pay considerable sums to the Dutch authority. Reacting to higher financial 
claims by the state, the Chinese tax farmers opened up new markets in order 
to collect more money (Diehl(1983)). Official and unofficial opium dealers 
went into the interior of Java to push the opium habit amongst the Indigenous 
agricultural population. Revenues from the opium tax increased, and so did 
opium consumption. After a sharp decline around 1800 due to the Napoleontic 
wars, it reached 18th century levels again in 1870. The Dutch colonial 
authorities were content, but in the Netherlands there was rising discomfort 
with the latter development. 
Around 1890 the political debate in the Netherlands on opium was at 
its peak. Looking back at this debate, there is a striking resemblance between 
the arguments then and the current arguments on the issue of drug legalisation. 
The opponents of the existing tax farm system argued that the dealers pushed 
the opium habit with all means, including threat and violence, and by means 
of organised prostitution and gambling. The greater 'opium kings' were too 
powerful and too rich. Drug-earned money allowed them to buy nearly 
everything within their territories. They caused corruption in the police force 
and amongst high-ranked civil servants. Whenever the state restricted the sale 
of opium by closing opium dens or opium shops, the tax farmers simply 
continued their activities secretly somewhere else. Whenever the state 
restricted the supply of opium to the tax farmers, they imported opium 
illegally from abroad. It was commonly agreed upon that the opium kings 
themselves were the greatest opium smugglers in the East Indies. 
Many critics were in favour of total prohibition. However, the large 
scale opium consumption had been a reality for many decades. Total 
prohibition would induce smuggling which was difficult to control due to the 
enormous coastlines of the Indian archipelago. 
In stead, a new idea originated which rapidly gained political support. 
This idea was the opiumregie. The regie was meant to be a state monopoly on 
the importation, preparation and distribution of smoking opium. It was 
supposed to achieve three policy goals: 
a) Reduction of criminality by crushing the power of the mighty opium 
dealers, ending the corruption and violence caused by opium 
transactions and reducing illegal opium sale in the regions as well as 
international smuggling. 
b) Reducing health risks by guaranteeing a product of constant quality 
and pureness. 
c) Reducing opium use. 
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These arguments are very similar to those advanced today in favour of the 
legalisation of drugs. 
In 1893 the law on the opiumregie was accepted in the Dutch 
pariiament. The opiumregie started as an experiment on the island of Madura 
near the Javanese coast. The experiment proved to be a success, and in 1898 
the Dutch government in The Hague decided to implement the opiumregie 
district by district all over Java. Implementation on Java was completed during 
1903. It took until 1914 before the opiumregie was introduced in all parts of 
the Dutch East Indies. 
figure 1 about here 
Figure 1 shows the developments in total opium consumption on Jaya 
and Madura over the period 1903-1940. There is a substantial increase in 
opium consumption in the period 1910-1920, but asharp decline in subsequent 
years. After a short period of increase in the late 1920s consumption declines 
again in the beginning of the 1930s, with a small increase in the second half 
of the 1930s. 
Before 1920 opium consumption in the Outer Islands was substantially 
larger than on Java and Madura. The general development of total opium 
consumption in the Outer Islands in the 1920s and 1930s is very much the 
same as on Java and Madura. On face value the opiumregie seems to have 
been highly successful in reaching its goal of reducing opium consumption. 
3. Characteristics of the opiumregie 
Before discussing the main policy instruments of the opiumregie, we 
stress that the opiumregie operated on the principle of regional differentiation. 
The main reason for differentiating policy measures along regional lines was 
that the opium smoking habit did not occur everywhere at the same level. In 
some regions, like the Islamic regions of West Java, opium smoking was not 
widespread. If opium smoking was almost absent, the sale of legal opium - if 
there was any - was stopped, and the use of opium was actually forbidden. In 
other regions opium smoking was almost as common as nowadays alcohol 
drinking in Western countries. This was especially the case in regions with 
substantial Chinese communities, or regions with large estates like the East 
Coast of Sumatra. The labour force on these agricultural, export-producing 
estates was to a large degree recruited from other parts of East Asia, and 
many of these displaced temporary contract workers proved to be opium 
smokers on arrival, or else soon afterwards. By and large the Chinese 
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population and contract workers (often overlapping categories) were subjected 
to less strict opium rules than the Indigenous and European parts of the 
population of the Dutch East Indies. 
The opiumregie had two main policy instruments: price regulation and 
a licence and registration system. 
The opiumregie folio wed a severe price policy. The price of opium 
was kept high to discourage consumers. This was a risky policy, as too high a 
price could encourage opium smuggling and subsequently the flourishing of a 
local illegal drug market. The nominal opium price was constant over long 
periods of time. Nevertheless, the instrument of price manipulation was 
rigorously used in 1920 and 1921, when the price level was raised 
substantially. In 1935 the price of opium was lowered, probably to discourage 
the use of smuggled opium and other cheaper drugs like morphine and heroin, 
which had gained some popularity in these years. 
figure 2 about here 
Figure 2 gives the nominal Java and Madura opium price in Dutch 
guilders per kilogram. The nominal opium price was increased substantially in 
the period 1918-1920 and decreased substantially in 1935. In between these 
dates the opium price was constant. 
The nominal opium price on the Outer Islands was substantially lower 
than on Java and Madura. Probably this has to do with the difficulty of 
intercepting opium smugglers supplying the Outer Islands with illegal market 
opium. The increase in opium price in the Outer Islands in the beginning of 
the twenties is not as abrupt. Also, the decrease of the opium price in 1935 is 
not as sudden as that on Java and Madura. 
The second major policy instrument was the license and registration 
policy. Simple registration of legal opium buyers started around 1910. The 
licence policy foliowed a few years later. The original objective was to make 
the opium habit die out slowly, together with the first and final generation of 
licensees. To reach this goal the sale of legal opium was limited to already 
active users, who now had to possess a license. New licenses were very 
reluctantly given, preferably only to those who could prove by a doctors 
statement that they were already addicted. License conditions were severest 
from 1924 until 1927. During this period there was no sale of legal opium to 
others than licensees throughout Java. In 1927 the system was modified. There 
were indications of increasing illegal opium and other drug use (especially 
morphine) by non license holders. In reaction, it was made easier to obtain a 
license. Nevertheless licenses remained obligatory in most regions of Java. In 
other regions part of the population, mainly the Chinese, were brought under 
the less severe obligation of customer registration. Again, the measures that 
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were taken differed between regions. 
The license and registration system was not only applied to curtail the 
number of opium users, it was also used to limit the amount of opium that 
users consumed. The quantities sold in the opium shops of the state were of 
Hmited size. It was not permitted to buy more than once a day, and 
registration made this control possible. Moreover, licensees were Hmited to a 
certain maximum monthly sale as prescribed in their licenses. For the period 
until 1927 we have no information on the restrictiveness of the license system. 
Information of the period 1927-1938 shows that the number of available 
licenses was never exhausted. The average sale per user was also far below 
the maximum. So, since 1927 the license system lost a great deal of its power 
as a policy instrument. 
For the period 1923-1938 we have information on the number of 
opium users by region and ethnic group. Figure 3 shows the total number of 
Chinese and Indigenous opium users on Java and Madura and on the Outer 
Islands. Before 1926 the number of opium users on Java and Madura is 
declining, while on the Outer Islands the numbers of Chinese users is slightly 
increasing. After 1926 the number of opium users is increasing in both areas, 
probably due to the modification of the license system, which made it easier to 
become an opium user. In the first half of the 1930s there is a substantial 
decrease in the number of users. This decrease may not be attributed to 
government policy with respect to the license system, since that did not 
change. As will appear from section 5 the increase in the real price of opium 
was responsible for the decline in the number of opium users in this period. 
After the mid 1930s the numbers of opium users are approximately constant. 
figure 3 about here 
4. Analyzing drug consumption 
The analysis of drug consumption can hardly be expected to be 
traditional. A drug is a consumer good with specific characteristics of which 
probably the most important is the addictive nature. A common idea is that 
once someone is consuming a drug he or she cannot do without it and has to 
keep on consuming. Furthermore, low levels of consumption cannot be 
sustained. To hold constant the 'pleasure' of consumption, in economie terms 
to keep constant utility, one needs increasing amounts of a drug. Substitution 
of drugs by non drugs is not possible without reducing the overall utility 
derived from consumption. Drug consumers are therefore supposed to be drug 
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addicts. In economie terms this means that the price elasticity of drug 
consumption is low or even zero. Changes in the price of drugs hardly affect 
drug consumption. For society the addictive nature of a drug has some nasty 
consequences. Since government policy aims at prohibition, prices of drugs 
are generally high. Drug consumers who cannot pay for the daily quantity 
they need out of their regular income are bound to find alternative ways. Drug 
addicts are supposed to be responsible for much criminal activity. 
In the policy discussion about legalization of drugs the demand 
elasticity is very important. Let's start with the common assumption that the 
demand elasticity is low. Then, prohibition causing high drug prices will lead 
to criminality. Legalization causing low drug prices will have a small effect on 
drug consumption and will reduce drug criminality substantially, on the supply 
side as well as on the demand side. So, if demand elasticity is low the main 
effect of legalization will be the reduction of criminality. 
Now, suppose the demand elasticity is high. Then, the high drug 
prices of prohibition will keep demand low. Low prices due to legalization 
will cause an increase in drugs demand. The effects on criminality are 
unclear. Each drug user has to pay less money to get what he or she wants, 
but there are many more drug users. 
In the discussion about the consumption of addictive goods some 
distinctions are relevant (Chaloupka, 1991). The first distinction refers to the 
tastes of consumers. Tastes may be endogenous or constant over the life cycle 
of the individual. If tastes are endogenous, present tastes are assumed to 
depend on past consumption, so utility is non-stationary. In empirical work 
non-stationary utility specified as function of current consumption may be 
transformed into stationary utility specified as function of current and lagged 
consumption (Boyer, 1983). If tastes are constant, addiction is introduced by 
assuming that the ability to produce the addictive commodity partly depends 
on past consumption. Again, this mechanism may be specified as a 
relationship between current and lagged consumption. So, in empirical work 
there is no difference between endogenous or constant tastes. 
The second distinction refers to the rationality of consumers. If current 
consumption only depends on past consumption, all future effects are ignored 
and consumers are assumed to behave myopically. However, if consumers 
also take future consumption into account when making decisions on current 
consumption, consumers are assumed to behave rationally. In empirical work 
rational and myopie consumption can be distinguished. If there is an effect of 
future consumption on current consumption, consumers behave rationally. If 
not, they behave myopically. 
The economie model of rational addiction was introduced by Becker 
and Murphy (1988), following Stigler and Becker (1977). In the Becker-
Murphy model past, present and future consumption are linked (see Appendix 
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1 for more details). As far as we know, there have not been many studies 
based on the Becker-Murphy model. Becker, Grossman and Murphy (1990) 
analyze US cigarette consumption and find support for the Becker-Murphy 
model since one period ahead consumption has a significant effect on current 
consumption. Long-run price elasticities are in the range -0.7 to -0.8, while 
short-run price elasticities are about -0.4. 
Chaloupka (1991) also analyses cigarette consumption using micro 
panel data from a survey of individuals. His estimated long-run price 
elasticities range from -0.3 to -0.5. He finds that his estimates support the 
Becker-Murphy model in the sense that cigarette smoking appears to be 
addictive, while individuals do not behave myopically. 
5. Empirical analysis of opium consumption 
5.1 Explanatory variables 
In the analysis of the developments in opium consumption the real 
opium price is an explanatory variable. We deflate the opium price using the 
price of rice as an indicator for consumer prices. According to Van Laanen 
(1989): 'by using the index of rice prices, secular price movements in the 
Indigenous sphere can be closely approximated'. A comparison of 
developments in rice price over the period 1920-1940 with an index of 'cost of 
living' (Creutzberg (1978)), confirms this similarity in developments. 
figure 4 about here 
Figure 4 shows the development of the real opium price. The real 
opium price did not change very much over the period 1903-1930. 
Apparently, the sharp rise in the nominal opium price in the period 1918-1920 
was somewhat damped by a sharp rise in the costs of living in the same 
period, so that the real opium price did not change that much. After 1930, the 
real price increases substantially due to a substantial decrease in the consumer 
prices (deflation). According to Maddison (1989): '... the fall in general price 
level in Indonesia was extreme even by the standards of the time...' So, the 
real opium price increased in the 1930s because of deflation. Again, the 
general patterns of the real price fluctuations on Java and Madura and the 
Outer Islands are quite similar. 
When analyzing developments in the legal opium market in the Dutch 
East Indies we have to deal with the possible interaction between the illegal 
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and legal opium market. We have some information of the size of the illegal 
market for opium, using the amount of illegal opium intercepted by the 
authorities as proxy. Table 2 gives some information on these amounts. 
table 2 about here 
The amounts fluctuate over time, but there is no obvious increase or decrease. 
Table 2 shows that legal opium consumption on Java and Madura in the period 
1905-09 was 29.200 kg/year, while in the period 1935-38 this was on average 
6.700 kg/year. The amount of captured illegal opium was on average 314 and 
300 kg. The enormous decrease of the consumption of legal opium does not 
seem to have been compensated to a large extent by illegal consumption. 
Furthermore, the amount of captured illegal opium in the period 1925-29 was 
about twice as high as in the period 1930-34, when the real opium price was 
substantially higher. So, there seems to be no strong relationship between the 
real price of opium and the size of the black market, nor does there seem to 
be a strong relationship between the size of the legal and the size of the illegal 
market. Nevertheless, we will investigate the influence of the size of the 
illegal market, as proxied by the amount of captured illegal opium. 
Another possible determinant of opium consumption is the licence and 
registration policy, which we discussed in section 3. This policy was very 
strict in the period 1924-26. In subsequent years it was easier to obtain a 
license and the number of actual licenses was always smaller than the 
maximum number set by the government. To investigate the effect of this 
policy we introducé a dummy variable which has a value of 0 until 1927 and a 
value of 1 in the period 1927-38. 
5.2 Total opium consumption 
We started the analysis by using the Becker-Murphy model. As shown 
in Appendix 1 the estimation results are quite unsatisfactory. Therefore, we 
put the question aside whether opium consumers behave myopie or rational. 
We concentrate on estimating price elasticities. We continue using loglinear 
equations, in which price elasticities are specified directly. The use of lagged 
opium consumption as an explanatory variable, allows us to distinguish 
between short term and long term effects. If there is such a distinction this 
indicates that opium is an addictive good. 
First, we investigate the developments in total opium consumption. 
Since we have no annual information of the size of the regional population, we 
use total regional consumption. To account for regional differences in the size 
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of the population or other non-observed regional differences, we use regional 
specific intercepts (fixed effects): 
ln(Yjit) = r0J + T, lnCYj,,.,) + r2 ln(prj>t) + r3 lnOl.) + T4 d2738,t [1] 
in which: Y = total opium consumption in kilogram 
pr = real opium price 
Il = amoumt of captured illegal opium 
j = region, 1-22
 v 
d2738 = dummy variable, until 1927=0, 1927-38 = 1 
In stead of estimating [1] directly we take first differences, thus elhninating 
the fixed effects: 
Aln(Yj;t) = rx Aln(Yj>M) + T2 Aln(prj>t) + T3 Aln(n,) + r4 Ad2738,t [2] 
We started the analysis using information of the period 1923-1938. As 
indicated in section 2, in this period opium had a Standard quality. For this 
period, opium consumption can be distinguished by ethnic group: Chinese and 
Indigenous. Estimation results of [2] for both ethnic groups are presented in 
table 3. For all estimates it appears that the coefficients of the price and 
lagged consumption variables are significant, which means that we may 
distinguish short term and long term price effects. The coefficients of the 
dummy variable are significant in all estimates. The change in the license 
policy in 1927 stimulated total drug consumption with about 18%. The effect 
of the illegal market is significant but small. 
The introduction of time specific dummy variables influences the 
estimated coefficients hardly. These variables account for all time specific 
effects and not just for the change in license policy. So, they also capture the 
effect of changes in for example the average yearly income. Introducing time 
specific dummy variables does significantly improve the estimation results. 
The coefficients of the lagged consumption variable and the price variable 
change somewhat: the short-run price elasticity increases somewhat, while the 
influence of lagged consumption is redueed. 
Comparing the separate estimation results with a combined one, it 
appears that there is no significant difference between Chinese and Indigenous 
(F-test value: 1.45). So, Chinese and Indigenous consumers have the same 
response to changes in the real opium price. This is striking because there are 
substantial differences between the ethnic groups in terms of consumption and 
income per head. The short term price elasticity in the pooled estimate is -
1.01, the long term price elasticity -1.27. 
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table 3 about here 
We also have information on opium consumption of the period 1905-
1938. This information is less detailed, we cannot make a distinction by ethnic 
group or distinguish captured illegal opium by region. The time period over 
which we have information differs by region, since the opiumregie started in 
different years. As indicated before, in 1904 the opiumregie was introduced in 
all the regions in Java and Madura, while it took until 1914 until the 
opiumregie was introduced in all regions of the Outer Islands. For the 5 
regions on Java and Madura we have 165 observations, for the 17 regions on 
the Outer Islands we have 486 observations. 
Apart from the dummy variable representing the license policy we also 
introducé a dummy variable for the period 1918-38 representing the change in 
the quality of opium which was introduced in the period 1917-1918. The 
estimation results are shown in table 4. Again we find very similar results as 
before. The coefficients of price, lagged consumption and the dummy variable 
for the change in license policy are all significant. For both Java and the Outer 
Islands we fmd a short-run price elasticity of about -0.6. The coëfficiënt of the 
lagged consumption variable is of the same size for both regions. The 
estimation results for both parts of the Dutch East Indies are very similar. The 
third line of table 3 presents the estimate in which all regions are combined. 
The change in opium quality in 1917-18 appears to have had a negative effect 
on opium consumption, which is logical since due to this change low 
concentrates of opium were banned. To get the same amount of opium a 
smaller quantity was needed. Finally, we introduced time specific dummy 
variables. This improves overall estimation results, indicating that more time-
specific effects than the change in opium quality and the license policy 
affected the opium consumption. It also appears that there is no significant 
difference between regions (F-test value: 1.38) or between the time periods 
1905-1922 and 1923-1938 (F-test value: 0.16). 
table 4 about here 
3.3 Number of users 
For the period 1923-1938 we have information on the number of 
opium users. We estimated a similar loglinear equation as [2] specifying the 
number of opium consumers (G) as a function of the lagged number of opium 
consumers, the current real opium price, the illegal market and the licence 
policy dummy. The estimation results are shown in table 5. For both Chinese 
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and Indigenous we find significant short term price elasticities of users in the 
range of -0.4 to -0.5. The coëfficiënt of the lagged endogenous variable is not 
significant, indicating that there is no difference between short-run and long-
run effects of price changes. There seems to be no effect of the size of the 
illegal market on the number of opium consumers. The estimation results also 
reveal government influence by the license system on the number of opium 
users. It appears that the change of policy in 1927 had a positive effect on the 
number of opium users, which increased with 17-22% in that year. This 
means that the increase in the number of opium consumers due to the change 
in license policy is of the same size as the increase in total opium 
consumption, which implies that the new consumers had on average the same 
consumption per head as the existing ones. 
The introduction of time specific dummy variables does improve the 
estimation results, but does not influence the estimated coefficients. Again, if 
we compare the separate estimation results with a combined one, it appears 
that there is no significant difference between Chinese and Indigenous (F-test 
value: 1.46). 
The (short term) price elasticity of the number of opium users in the 
pooled estimate is -0.47. The estimated price elasticity of the number of 
opium consumers is about half the price elasticity of total opium consumption. 
This indicates that a price change influences both the number of opium 
consumers and the consumption per opium consumer in about the same way. 
table 5 about here 
6. Conclusions 
In this article we have analyzed a case of actual government 
intervention in a drugs market. By the so called opiumregie, the Dutch 
government controlled the opium market in the Dutch East Indies - nowadays 
Indonesia - for several decades in the beginning of this century. Using 
information gathered during the opiumregie we estimated price elasticities of 
the demand for opium. We use information of different groups of consumers 
and different time periods. The estimation results are very similar: short-term 
elasticities of opium consumption range are about -1.0, long-term elasticities 
about -1.25. There is no big difference between short-term and long-term 
price effects. Apparently, opium was not very addictive. The effect of price 
changes on opium consumption consists of two parts: the effect on the number 
of opium consumers and the effect on the average consumption per consumer. 
Our analysis reveals that the price elasticity of the number of opium 
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consumers is about -0.5. So, both effect are of the same size. 
From our analysis it also appears that the license policy influenced the 
number of opium users. The change of policy in 1927, when it became easier 
to obtain a license had an autonomous positive effect on the number of opium 
users and thus on total opium consumption. 
All in all the opiumregie, which led to a substantial increase in real 
opium prices, caused an impressive reduction in the consumption of opium. 
The system of market intervention succeeded in achieving its major policy 
goals: first the control over the drug market and then the reduction of drug 
consumption. It is not clear to what extent the price policy was coincidental. 
The major increases in real opium price were not due to an increase in 
nominal opium price - which was controlled by the government - but due to 
large decreases in the general price level. 
What do we learn from the Dutch experiments of the opium regie? 
Nowadays, the notion is common that most drug users are addicts. Therefore, 
it is widely presumed that drug users are unable to change their consumption 
level and will adjust their financial position to their consumption level by 
means of crime, if necessary. Our analysis contradicts this common notion, 
since it indicates that opium users were quite able to adjust their consumption 
to price changes. This seems to point out that under the opiumregie the 
incentives for drug related crime were not very strong. This view is supported 
by the opinions of most contemporary observers of the opiumregie. Many of 
them did not even mention drug-related crime as a problem. Instead, it was 
emphasized more than once that crime was much more related to alcohol 
abuse (notably acts of violence). 
The estimated price elasticities of opium are not small. We think the 
same applies to drug consumption nowadays. Low prices will stimulate drugs 
demand both by increasing the drug use per user and by increasing the number 
of users. However, we have to be careful in drawing firm conclusions. The 
government intervention in the Dutch East Indies foliowed a period of market 
freedom. The situation in the 1990s is one of prohibition. This implies that we 
should consider the effects of a change from prohibition to market intervention 
in stead of a change from market freedom to market intervention. 
Nevertheless, today market intervention may be a good policy to consider 
when it comes to drugs. Market intervention may succeed where prohibition 
seems to fail and uncontrolled legalization is too risky. 
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Appendix 1 The Becker-Murphy model 
Al. 1 The theory 
In the Becker-Murphy (1988) model tastes are constant, while consumers 
of addictive goods are assumed to behave rational. The concave utility function is 
specified as2: 
Ut = U(Ct, Yt, YM) [Al] 
in which: U = utility 
C = composite commodity 
Y = consumption of drug 
t = index of time 
Individuals are assumed to maximize their lifetime utility (E°°t=i (l+r)1_t U,), subject 
to a budget constraint representing lifetime income: 
S"t-i (1 +r)1"t (Q + PtY.) = A° [A2] 
in which: r = discount rate 
P = price of the drug (price of composite 
commodity = 1 ) 
A° = present value of wealth 
There are two first order conditions: 
U.CQ, ¥„¥,_!> = X [A3] 
U^Q.Y^Y^) + (l/(l+r).U3(Ct+1,Yt+1,Y,)= X.Pt [A4] 
in which: X = marginal utility of wealth 
The first order condition [A4] is the intertemporal condition linking past, present and 
future consumption. 
Becker and Murphy find an analytical solution of the maximization by using 
a quadratic utility function, which leads to a linear demand function for the addictive 
good: 
2
 In a more general specification lagged drug consumption Yt.x is replaced by the 
stock of drug consumption capital St. Then, the influence of consumption goes back 
for more than 1 year. Becker and Murphy also add an error term representing 
unmeasured life cycle variables. We omit this error term here, but account for it in 
the estimation procedures. 
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Yt = /30 + j8,.Ytl + j82.Yt+1 + /33.Pt [A5] 
in which: ft/ft = 1/(1+r) 
In this equation current consumption is related to current prices, lagged consumption 
and future consumption. Equation [A5] encompasses several types of consumer 
behaviour: 
If ft = 02 = 0, then there is no addiction 
If j82 = 0 and 0 < 01 < 1, then there is addiction of myopie 
consumers. 
If 0 < 0! < 1 and 0 < /32 < 1, then there is rational addiction. If |S2 is substantially smaller than J8J, then the discount rate is large. 
Al.2 Empirical analysis 
Becker, Grossman and Murphy (1990) analyze US cigarette consumption, 
using annual data (31 years) distinguished by state (50). They estimate equation [A5] 
with real (= deflated) cigarette prices, adding state and time-specific dummy 
variables. Our data enable us to perform a similar analysis. 
Lacking annual information of the size of the regional population, we use 
1930 data to calculate regional opium consumption per head. Opium prices are 
deflated by using the rice price as an indicator of the general price level of consumer 
prices. To investigate the effects of the change in the license system in 1927 we 
added a dummy variable with a value of 0 in the period until 1927 and a value of 1 
in the period 1927-1938. To account for regional differences we use regional 
specifie intercepts (fixed effects): 
Yü.t = 0o,s + 0i,i yö>t-i + 02,i ya,,+i + 03>i prjit + 04>i ilt + 05)i d2738>t [A6] 
in which: y = opium consumption in kilograms per head 
pr = real opium price 
il = captured amount of illegal opium per head 
i = ethnic group, Indigenous or Chinese 
j = region, 1-22 
d273g = dummy variable, 1924-26=0, 1927-38 = 1 
In the estimates we used one period lagged and one period ahead price as 
instruments for lagged and future opium consumption. By taking first differences the 
regional fixed effects are excluded: 
Ayij)t = 0i,i AyStM + 02.i Ayijit+1 + 0ji3 Aprj>t + j84>i Ailt + 05ji Ad2738jt [A7] 
The estimation results of [A7] are shown in table Al. 
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Apr Ail Ad 2 7 3 8 
-0.20(1.2) -0.00 (0.4) 0.06(0.1) 
-1.07 (3.3) -0.01 (4.1) 1.31 (1.3) 
-0.87 (1.6) -0.00 (0.4) 
-0.92(1.5) -0.02 (2.5) 
Table Al Estimation results regjonal opium consumption per head distinguish by ethnic 
group: 1924-1937 3) 
Ay(-l) Ay(+1) 
Indigenous 0.41(2.1) 0.64(4.6) 
Chinese 0.15(0.8) 0.54(4.8) 
Indigenous10 1.29 (2.0) -0.01 (0.0) 
Chineseb) 0.94 (3.2) -0.04 (0.0) 
a)
 Two stage least squares using Apr(-l) and Apr(+1) as instruments for Ay(-l) and Ay(+1); 
; absolute t-values in parentheses 
b)
 Estimate includes time specific dummy variables 
From these estimation results it is difficult to draw firm conclusions. The 
coefficients of the dummy variable representing the licensing policy are not 
significantly different from zero. Those of the illegal market are significantly 
negative for Chinese. The sign of the coëfficiënt of the price variable is correct. The 
coefficients of the one period ahead variable is larger than that of the lagged 
variable. 
In our second estimates we added time-specific dummy variables, excluding 
the license policy variable. The estimation results show that this especially influences 
the coefficients of lagged and future consumption. The coefficients of the lagged 
consumption variable are now very high, those of future consumption very small. 
All in all we conclude that our data are not quite capable of making a distinction 
between rational and myopie addiction. 
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Table 1 Population. average income. opium users and opium consumption in the 
Dutch East Indies by region and ethnic group in 1930 
Java and Outer Total 
Madura Islands 
Population (min) 
Indigenous 40.9 18.2 59.1 
Chinese 0.6 0.6 1.2 
Income per head (gld)a) 
Indigenous 55 66 59 
Chinese 310 320 310 
Opium users (1000) 
Indigenous 76.4 10.1 86.5 
Chinese 17.9 62.8 80.7 
Opium consumption (1000 kg)b) 
Indigenous 10.0 1.9 11.9 
Chinese 10.4 27.0 37.4 
Opium consumption (kg/user) 
Indigenous 0.13 0.19 0.14 
Chinese 0.58 0.43 0.46 
a)
 gld = Dutch guilders; Chinese include other Asiatics 
kg = kilograms 
Table 2 Legal consumption of opium and captured illegal opium 
Java and Captured illegal Legal opium Captured illegal 
Madura opium (kg/year) (1000 kg/year) (% of legal) 
1905-09 314 29.2 1.1 
1910-14 192 33.0 0.6 
1915-19 188 36.8 0.5 
1920-24 190 33.0 0.6 
1925-29 600 23.6 2.5 
1930-34 358 12.4 2.9 
1935-38 300 6.7 4.5 
Outer 
Islands 
1915-19 101 54.6 0.2 
1920-24 194 38.0 0.5 
1925-29 620 33.9 • 1.8 
1930-34 306 16.5 1.9 
1935-38 235 11.5 2.0 
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Table 3 Estimation results regional opium consumption by ethnic group: 1924-1938 
Aln(Yt.1) Aln(prt) AlnfllO Ad2738,t R2 
Chinese 0.24 (5.2) -0.79 (10.6) -0.03 (3.2) 0.20 (4.6) 0.429 
Indigenous 0.15 (3.7) -0.87 (10.9) -0.02 (1.7) 0.14(2.9) 0.361 
Chineseb) 0.23 (4.1) -0.81 (3.5) -0.03(2.8) - 0.503 
Indigenousb) 0.13 (2.9) -1.01 (4.7) -0.01(1.7) - 0.422 
Totalb) 0.19(5.5) -1.01 (5.8) -0.02(2.6) 0.460 
a)
 Intercept included in the regressions; absolute t-values in parentheses; R2 corrected 
for degrees of freedom 
b)
 Time-specific dummy variables included 
Table 4 Estimation results regional opium consumption: various time periods during 
1905-1938a) 
Aln(Yt.,) Aln(pr.) Ad2738jt Ad1838?t R2 
Java and 
Madura 0.34 (5.7) -0.59 (9.5) 0.19 (3.2) -0.17 (2.8) 0.485 
Outer Islands 0.23(5.9) -0.55(10.2) 0.21(4.3) -0.11(2.2) 0.287 
Total 0.25(7.5) -0.55(13.0) 0.20(5.1) -0.12(3.0) 0.321 
Totalb) 0.16(4.1) -0.82(7.1) - - 0.436 
a)
 Java and Madura: 5 regions, 165 observations; Outer Islands: 17 regions, 486 
observations; intercept included in the regressions; absolute t-values in parentheses; 
R2 corrected for degrees of freedom 
b)
 Time-specific dummy variables included 
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Table 5 Estimation results regional number of opium users by ethnic group: 1924-
1938a) 
Aln(Gt.!) Aln(pr,) AlnfllJ Ad273g>t R2 
Chinese 0.01 (0.2) -0.48 (6.2) -0.02(1.7) 0.22(4.8) 0.164 
Indigenous 0.06 (1.6) -0.39 (5.5) 0.01(1.1) 0.17(4.0) 0.129 
Chineseb) -0.08 (1.4) -0.37 (1.5) -0.01 (0.9) - 0.259 
Indigenousb) 0.03 (0.7) -0.55 (2.3) 0.02(2.1) - 0.192 
Chineseb) - -0.43 (1.7) - - 0.258 
Indigenous» - -0.51(2.1) - - 0.184 
Totalb) - -0.47(2.7) - - 0.231 
a)
 Intercept included in the regressions; absolute t-values in parentheses; R2 corrected 
for degrees of freedom 
b)
 Time-specific dummy variables included 
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Figure 1 Opium consumption on Java and Madura and on the Outer Islands: 1905-
1938 (1000 kg) 
Figure 2 Nominal opium price on Java and Madura and on the Outer Islands: 1905-
1938 (Dutch guilders/kgt 
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Figure 3 Number of Chinese and Indigenous opium users on Java and Madura and 
on the Outer Islands: 1923-1938 (1000) 
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Figure 4 Real opium prices on Java and Madura and on the Outer Islands: 1905-
1938(1913 = 100) 
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